26 U 0206:29-04-26 0206:29-04-26 08:37:09.000 0206:29-04-26 utf8 0 Osu Text txt Computermedien c Online-Ressource cr 1969808462 10.1080/00036846.2025.2471590 KXP 1969808462 eng rda 2026 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00036846.2025.2471590?download=true application/pdf H ZZ https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2025.2471590 R ZZ ZDB-1-TFL-article ZDB-7-TFS-article Rockets and feathers in CEO compensation a test of asymmetric pay related to stock price Randall C. Campbell and Gregory L. Nagel 302400281 Tpv3 gnd/17181519X 132578905 piz Campbell Randall C. VerfasserIn aut Gregory L. Nagel VerfasserIn aut 58 2026 10 1887-1897 Enthalten in 269016880 Obv zdb/1473581-7 077662199 1466-4283 Applied economics New York, NY Routledge 1969 Online-Ressource 202600000580010113 FS Executive compensation DE-206 FS contract theory DE-206 FS CEO incentives DE-206 FS asymmetric DE-206 49 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift Article 26 PICA 29-04-26 08:37:09.000 utf8 29-04-26 6877 0206 We find an asymmetric response of pay to stock return for S&P 1500 CEOs over the 1994–2019 period. We find evidence of this asymmetric effect in the period from 2010–2019 when more than 75% of CEOs in the sample are awarded stock pay. In the earlier period, 1996–2005, when around 25% of CEOs received stock pay, we find that CEO rewards for good stock performance are symmetric with penalties for poor stock performance and that CEO pay increases with firm risk. In the later period, CEO pay has no relation to firm risk and responds asymmetrically to stock performance by nearly eliminating any penalty for negative performance. Through both periods, financial constraints reduce CEO pay. The change to asymmetry is complemented by an 85% increase in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to negative stock performance, although turnover is still a rare event. We find that the lack of relation to firm risk and change to asymmetric pay in the post-crisis period is related to the change from option to stock incentives. 29-04-26 29-04-26 08:37:09.000 utf8 29-04-26 6877 0206 4960044314 29-04-26 x1z